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INTRODUCTION
B
usiness is becoming increasingly projectized or project oriented, 
with many billions of dollars being spent annually on projects 
around the world. Building new capital assets, carrying out unique 
large-scale enterprises, or developing new technological products, 
all require major projects to be undertaken. The benefits of projectization and 
a good approach to project management can clearly be seen in many ways: 
these include motivation, satisfaction, and giving meaning to the work of 
individuals and teams (Thomas & Mullaly, 2008). However, the reputation of 
project management with most people is that it is generally unsuccessful, with 
projects being late, overspent, and often not technically successful. The media 
delights in reporting on large public construction projects that have suffered 
huge cost or time overruns, such as the United Kingdom’s Scottish Parliament 
(“10 times over budget and more than three years late,” Tempest, 2004), or a 
healthcare project in the United Kingdom with “much uncertainty about the 
costs . . . unlikely to complete . . . anywhere near its original schedule.” (House 
of Commons, 2007)
This article concentrates on complex projects, because the effects of risks 
within such projects are difficult to understand without analysis. We use 
the well-known Simon (1982) description of a complex system being one in 
which the behavior of the whole is difficult to deduce from understanding 
the inputs to the system. Thus, in a complex project, understanding what 
is likely to impact the project does not lead simply to an understanding of 
what that impact might be. We therefore use a structured approach to project 
complexity to help identify where the risks are occurring.
Although this article concentrates on complex projects, it does not imply 
that the uncertainties facing “complex” projects are any greater than those 
impacting any other type of project. Rather, these uncertainties are likely to be 
more interconnected, likely to change, there will need to be reactions within 
a highly paced project, or there will be socio-political risks whose effects are 
uncertain. This mixture will create a project risk that is difficult to compre-
hend in its totality, whose key uncertainties are difficult to detect, and for 
which risks are likely to compound and cause an overall greater risk picture.
Study has advanced in understanding complexity in projects (Geraldi, 
Maylor, & Williams, 2011) and has enabled a transactional-cost understand-
ing of behavior within a project (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2016). This work, 
and the study of the behavior of particular projects, has led to the realization 
that the consideration of risk before a project starts, and particularly the com-
mon practices in project risk analysis, are woefully inadequate for complex 
projects. Indeed, common practices can sometimes divert attention away 
from the key risks to less important ones. Understanding comes from looking 
at the lived experience of projects (Cicmil, Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 
2006) along the lines of Blomquist, Hällgren, Nilsson, and Söderholm’s (2010) 
project-as-practice research.
Risk analysis is important for complex proj-
ects; however, systemicity makes evaluating 
risk in real projects difficult. Looking at the 
causal structure of risks is a start, but causal 
chains need to include management actions, 
the motivations of project actors, and socio-
political project complexities as well as 
intra-connectedness and feedback. Com-
mon practice based upon decomposition- 
type methods is often shown to point to 
the wrong risks. A complexity structure is 
used to identify systemicity and draws les-
sons about key risks. We describe how to 
analyze the systemic nature of risk and how 
the contractor and client can understand the 
ramifications of their actions.
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Risks set up causal chains, often 
involving human motivational reac-
tions to events and decision making by 
the project parties. The problems are 
significantly exacerbated when these 
chains lead to positive feedback loops. 
Furthermore, understanding the behav-
ior of such projects therefore becomes 
difficult, taking away the rational basis 
for decision making by the project par-
ties that Brown et al. (2016) assumes. 
The risks discussed in this article are 
known within the project and infor-
mation systems literature, and this lit-
erature already considers both residual 
risks and unintended consequences. 
However, this article shows the lack 
of consideration to some of the rami-
fications of such risks, specifically the 
risks that enlarge rather than mitigate 
through actions. Such issues will often 
overwhelm in size the issues described 
in project risk management practice 
and literature. These issues, therefore, 
need attention if the credibility of proj-
ect risk management is to be salvaged 
and indeed the credibility of our ability 
to set up and manage complex projects.
This article will look at the idea 
of systemicity in complex projects to 
identify the issue and will review the 
current risk management thinking and 
practice to identify the gap. It will then 
follow Geraldi et al.’s article to look at 
the implications of complexity, and how 
unexpected risks can become more sig-
nificant within a project.
Projects and Systemicity
A conventional view of projects breaks 
them down into their constituent parts—
in scope (work breakdown structure), 
time (critical path networks), cost (bud-
gets), risk (risk registers), and so on. (In 
some of the other aspects, there has been 
more progress in looking holistically, but 
risk work still generally revolves around 
decomposition into individual parts). 
This, however, is inadequate for complex 
projects, as defined by Simon earlier.
There has been recognition in the lit-
erature that risks can be inter-related. Dat-
ing back to 1990, Al-Bahar and Crandall 
(1990) recognized the systemic structure 
of risks, which was continued by Williams, 
Ackermann, and Eden (1997) and, more 
recently, by Kwan and Leung (2011) for 
software risks and Fang, Marle, and Zio 
(2012) for engineering projects. Never-
theless, these are still largely single risks, 
recognized by standard risk identification 
techniques, which are then sometimes 
taken to be in a systemic relationship. 
Cavallo and Ireland (2014) working in 
a different field (disaster preparedness) 
start to consider what they call “unfore-
seeable risks”; they use Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM) to understand the 
underlying system of risks. In this article, 
we will consider the “softer” human and 
socio-economic causal relationships that 
link these risks and approach the risks as 
a systemic whole.
Over the past 30 years, our view of the 
behavior of complex projects has devel-
oped in many ways, in particular, in the 
use of systemic modeling. This began 
with Cooper’s work on the Ingalls Ship-
building case (Cooper, 1980) and contin-
ued with others at PA Consulting/MIT. 
A second team at Strathclyde University 
(of which this author was a member) 
started with the Channel Tunnel “Shuttle 
Wagons” project (Ackermann, Eden, & 
Williams, 1997) by using mapping to 
structure causality and providing an inter-
face with System Dynamics quantitative 
modeling (Howick, Eden,  Ackermann, & 
Williams, 2008). A review of this body 
of work ( Williams, 2005) and its impli-
cations showed not only that project 
behavior could be explained by systemic 
inter-related sets of causal factors rather 
than linking effects to single causes but, 
specifically, behavior (resulting from the 
dynamics set up) that turned into positive 
feedback loops, or ‘vicious circles.’ This 
positive feedback can cause significant 
over-spends and “runaway.” The Shuttle 
Wagons project, for example, had a spe-
cific major change following a fire, and 
continuous (multiple, small) approval 
delays, leading to a structure such as that 
shown in Figure 1. In this very simplified 
illustrative diagram, we can see some 
simple positive feedback loops initiated 
by the delays caused by design changes 
and delays in owner approvals and linked 
to the very tight timescale. The delays 
led to activities being carried out more 
in parallel than would be appropriate in 
engineering terms, leading both to more 
delays (in a feedback loop) and also to a 
delay in the overall system freeze. These, 
in turn, mean that more work needs to 
be done without the necessary surround-
ing engineering information completed 
and frozen. Further, while some of this 
work will remain sound, some will need 
to be re-worked, hence exacerbating the 
delays and increasing the positive feed-
back. Lyneis and Ford (2007) provided a 
survey of the use of System Dynamics in 
modeling projects.
The idea that issues within projects 
arise from systemic causal sets of rea-
sons is gaining increasing recognition 
(some recently described by Lefle and 
Loch, 2010). Keil and Mähring (2010) 
identified a key problem of project esca-
lation as seeing problems as isolated 
incidents, so that a piecemeal approach 
to solving the problems is ineffective 
because this approach does not get to 
the “underlying root causes of prob-
lems.” They identified many fine strate-
gies without identifying the underlying 
systemicity and vicious-circle nature of 
the problems addressed. Merrow, bas-
ing his comments on the analysis of his 
large database of megaprojects, stated:
“In projects, bad things tend to happen in 
groups, not individually . . . . . Events that 
affect projects in major ways . . . tend to 
go together. Even when one of those things 
occurs individually, it tends to trigger a 
cascade of problematic effects.” (Merrow, 
2011, p. 327)
Similarly, Thamhain stated:
“Undesirable events (contingencies) are 
often caused by a multitude of problems . . . 
these problems often cascade, compound, 
and become intricately linked . . . . clearly 
even small and anticipated contingencies 
. . . can lead to issues with other groups, 
confusion, organizational conflict, sink-
ing team spirit, and fading commitment.” 
(Thamhain, 2013, p. 29)
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Thamhein emphasized the impor-
tance of dealing with these risks early in 
the project life cycle; however, he also 
acknowledged the “enormous difficul-
ties” of actually predicting the risk situa-
tions and understanding their systemic 
complexity. He also noted that senior 
managers rated the performance impact 
of risks, on average, to be 30% lower 
than project managers did—possibly 
showing the higher expectations of the 
project manager to manage perturba-
tions and perhaps also revealing less 
understanding of the cascading nature 
of project risks.
Current Risk Management 
Thinking and Practice
In this environment of complex proj-
ects, how are risks identified and man-
aged in practice? We use the term “risk” 
here in the typical sense as relating to 
any uncertainty that has an effect on 
a project. We are not trying to look for 
definitional distinctions, but recognize 
two essential points. First, uncertain-
ties are a collection of both aleatoric 
(i.e., those to which probabilities can 
be objectively related) and epistemic 
(i.e., those stemming from a lack of suffi-
cient knowledge) with many combining 
both aspects (Williams & Samset, 2010). 
Second, risks might include “good” 
opportunities as well as downside risks.
Risk management has become a core 
part of project initiation and execution 
since its formal recognition in projects 
in the 1980s. However, the methods used 
in practice still reflect the early reliance 
on lists (or “risk registers”) of individual 
risk items (Williams, 1994). The Project 
Management Institute’s A Guide to the 
Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK ® Guide) – Fifth Edition (2013) 
(which is an ANSI standard) in its lat-
est version makes brief mentions of the 
existence of methods to deal with inter-
relatedness. In the United Kingdom, the 
Association for Project Management’s 
Project Risk Analysis and Management 
Guide (2004) has an appendix on the 
issue but later publications, including 
their guide on Prioritising Project Risks] 
(Association for Project Management, 
2008), are clearly geared toward under-
standing and prioritizing individual 
risks. Leitch (2011) points out that ISO 
31000 offers no recommendations on 
aggregating, splitting, or combining 
risks. Indeed, an influential review risk 
management standard in 2005 made no 
mention of risk combinations (Raz & 
Hillson, 2005). These standards do not 
actually prohibit more systemic think-
ing. However, Hodgson’s (2002) Fou-
cauldian analysis shows how, although 
More 
rework
Tight
timescale
More
parallelism
Activities more
co-related
Increased
delay
Activities
take longer
Approval
delays
Design
change
More work on
unfrozen items
Delayed
system freeze
Figure 1: Generic delays in the Shuttle project.
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those advocating project management 
toolkits claim them to be “universal and 
politically neutral,” their actual use in 
practice enforced by management leads 
to a specific way of thinking and indeed 
ontology inculcated into an organiza-
tion, thus actually inhibiting systemic 
thinking.
There is some recognition in stan-
dard methodology that comprehending 
overall risk is needed to achieve proper 
understanding. PMI’s Practice Standard 
for Project Risk Management (Project 
Management Institute, 2009) and the 
United Kingdom’s Association for Proj-
ect Management’s (2012) Body of Knowl-
edge have started talking about two-level 
definitions of risk, covering both indi-
vidual risks and “overall project risk.” In 
general, however, project risk processes 
still only address the former level, and 
there is little advice on how to address 
the latter. Hopkinson’s (2011) Project 
Risk Maturity Model states that “achiev-
ing the highest RMM [Risk Management 
Maturity] level (Level 4) does depend 
upon the use of quantitative techniques 
to understand the implications of over-
all project risk. Using a simple qual-
itative approach based on managing 
risks on a risk-by-risk basis will there-
fore limit a project to having a level 3 
RMM capability at best”; this, however, 
still only provides a passing mention 
in one paragraph (p. 138) to the way 
that complexity in projects produces 
systemic risks. Indeed, while cross-risk 
correlation is discussed, Monte Carlo 
schedule analysis is used without spe-
cifically modeling management activity 
or human reactions within the project, 
which is an important element in pro-
ducing the systemicity. Williams (2004) 
shows that using Monte Carlo schedule 
analysis without modeling how man-
agement reacts to project events and 
progress provides misleading results.
The academic project literature 
clearly recognizes complexity within 
projects. Nonetheless, with the excep-
tion of those authors who were quoted 
in the previous section (Thamhain, 2013; 
Merrow, 2011), the explicit identification 
and analysis of risk are not typical fea-
tures of the discussion, although the 
issues are recognized. The risk chapter 
of the project management “state-of-the-
art” handbook by three leading aca-
demics (Winch & Maytorena, 2011) 
provides limited information on risk 
inter-relationships. The literature indeed 
addresses the increasing complexity 
and intra-connectedness of projects, yet 
the implications for project risk are not 
drawn out. For example, the chapter on 
project risk by Loosemore (2006) in Pryke 
and Smyth’s work tellingly entitled “Man-
aging Project Risks” (in the plural), has a 
deeper understanding of what an indi-
vidual risk represents but does not con-
sider risk combinations and the resulting 
causal chains involving humans. Cooke-
Davies’s (2011) edited book states that 
“complexity in projects probably has its 
greatest impact in the sphere of risk man-
agement,” although it does not provide 
specific advice for the practical use of 
the ideas in risk management. Hass’s 
(2009) popular book on managing com-
plex projects describes some of the prob-
lems covered in this article, stating that 
“risk management is one of the most 
neglected aspects of managing complex 
projects” and suggests some useful man-
agement ideas for retaining a view of the 
risk systemicity. Remington and Pollack’s 
(2008) book seeking tools for complex 
projects also recognizes the issue of risk 
inter-dependence, and indeed includes 
a chapter with a technique called “Risk 
Interdependencies,” which goes some 
way in recognizing the issues but does 
not explore the ramified causal chains 
or the human elements of those causal 
chains. Ackermann, Howick, Quigley, 
Walls, and Houghton (2014) recognize 
and expand on some of these issues 
further.
Where complexity within project 
risk is recognized, some try to cap-
ture the complexity by the use of 
simple spreadsheets and question-
naires; Maylor, Turner, and Murray-
Webster (2013) is one example. 
Similarly, Maynard (2013) looks at eight 
dimensions of project complexity, split 
further by a mind-map-type decom-
position (although the first dimension, 
“Risks and opportunities,” shows risk 
as an input to complexity, rather than 
uncertainty being the input and risk 
being the resultant issue). The Trea-
sury Board of Canada (2013) provides 
a similar full scoring model but, again, 
this model does not capture systemic-
ity; similarly, the spreadsheet used by 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, with 
its 15 risk questions and 16 complexity 
questions. Perhaps the most research-
based model is the GAPPS CIFTER 
analysis (discussed by Aitken and 
Crawford, 2007). These methods offer 
useful pointers to decision makers, and 
can identify broad areas of likely com-
plexity, but they do not help us to iden-
tify, understand, or model the systemic 
risks of a project and the causal chains.
Given the lack of information in the 
standard methodologies then, does it 
mean that the topic of this article is unim-
portant? There are mixed views on the 
extent to which current risk management 
has an effect on project success. Some 
authors (for example, de Bakker, Boon-
stra, & Wortmann, 2010; Cooke-Davies, 
2000) show that, not surprisingly, even 
some levels of attention to project risk 
help projects achieve their objectives. de 
Bakker, Boonstra, and Wortmann (2012) 
point to the simple identification of risks 
as having the most effect. Beyond this, 
however, the evidence about the rela-
tionship between risk management and 
project success is at best mixed (Zwikael 
& Globerson, 2006, describe it as a “low 
impact process”; see also, e.g., Ropponen 
& Lyytinen, 1997). This suggests that cur-
rent methods are not convincing users 
of the successful handling of risk and 
perhaps not providing understanding of 
the overall risk to the project. We will 
now therefore try to understand in a 
more structured way what risk means in 
a complex project.
Hardy and MacGuire (2016) draw 
upon the work of Foucault and explore 
the “implications of organizations’ being 
situated in a dominant discourse of risk” 
and the difficulties of changing those 
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ways, even when it is known that they 
are ineffective. The established norms of 
(separate) risk identification and man-
agement risk-by-risk, undertaken by 
particular actors who have legitimacy 
to identify, quantify, and manage those 
risks, means that risk becomes (quoting, 
Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 
2009, p. 143) “identifiable through sci-
entific measurement and calculation, 
and [can] be controlled using such 
knowledge.” Changing this dominant 
discourse means “challenging the privi-
leged position” of risk “experts” and 
drawing on “alternative discourses,” 
particularly in the case of systemic risks 
where causality is less clear.
The Structure of Complexity
A contingency view of projects recog-
nizes the need to take project complex-
ity into account. Williams (2005) calls 
for different ways of understanding and 
managing projects in situations of high 
structural complexity, high uncertainty, 
and high pace. Similarly, Shenhar’s 
“Diamond” model (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007) 
divides projects (and thus what is needed 
to manage them) by project (structural) 
complexity, pace, novelty, and technol-
ogy (although this does not have the 
underlying basis of the systemicity rea-
soning as described earlier). As our guide 
for this article, we refer to Geraldi et al. 
(2011), who try to define this overall set 
of concepts that describe the complexity 
of projects according to five dimensions: 
structural, uncertainty, dynamics, pace, 
and socio-political. What then are the 
implications for how we regard risk?
Structural complexity implies mul-
tiple interacting elements. Where there 
are uncertainty and dynamics in the 
system, then multiple interacting risks 
will be present. Thus, the first straight-
forward implication is:
(1) Technical complexity means a system 
view of risk needs to be taken.
However, when the system is further 
disrupted by pace so that acceleration 
decisions need to be made, the internal 
socio-complexity of the project needs to 
be considered—in other words, the fact 
that projects are carried out by teams 
of humans. There are two key elements 
that need to be considered.
The first and perhaps more straight-
forward element is that human project 
managers will react to perturbations in 
the project. An example of this is the 
move to increased parallelism or work-
ing on unfrozen items as shown in 
Figure 1. Indeed, it is the ramifications 
of such actions within systemicity that 
means that sometimes they have appar-
ently counter-intuitive effects (Eden, 
Williams, Ackermann, & Howick, 2000). 
This is particularly so in projects subject 
to high pace or high time constraints. In 
such projects, attempts to accelerate the 
project increase the parallelism and make 
the project even more difficult to manage 
and less stable, and so costs spiral out of 
control, making it difficult to relate proj-
ect spend to individual parts of the proj-
ect (Eden, Ackermann, & Williams, 2005).
More complex is that the project 
workforce will react to perturbations 
within the project. For example, there 
can be an increase in nugatory work, 
making this work less meaningful, 
increasing errors and, in Thamhein’s 
words above, there is “confusion, organi-
zational conflict, sinking team spirit, and 
fading commitment.” In recent years, 
there has been increasing emphasis 
on the importance of effective experi-
ence in motivating work. Seo, Barrett, 
and Bartunek (2004) demonstrate the 
implications on goal performance of a 
“pleasant” core effect or, conversely, the 
effect of a negative emotional reaction 
when project events occur. Where proj-
ect workers become disheartened, or 
fatigued, or start to make mistakes, then 
these effects are keys to the progress of 
the project. Even if these clearly identi-
fied aspects are avoided, creativity and 
innovation will decrease. Disruption 
(under high “pace”) can cause a proj-
ect team to lose its “conceptual slack” 
and its ability to sensemake (Grabher 
& Thiel, 2014), and a negative mood if 
combined with a lack of empowerment 
diminishes creativity (To, Fisher, & 
Ashkanasy, 2015). Interpersonal con-
flict, within the project or with the client, 
damages project performance through 
negative emotions (Zhang & Huo, 2015). 
In the backs of many project workers’ 
minds, when there are signs that a proj-
ect is not proceeding well, there is the 
fear of project failure (Shepherd & Car-
don, 2009). Theories of human behavior, 
such as that by Bourdieu (1998) (see a 
discussion of how this can be used in 
the understanding of project behavior in 
O’Leary, 2012) can be useful in under-
standing the human aspects of project 
behavior. However, more work is needed 
to quantify the relationships between 
drivers, such as changes or conflict and 
outcomes such as productivity or error-
rate, and the role of emotions within 
these relationships. Nevertheless, it is 
a key feature of the system modeling of 
projects above, that such human aspects 
are essential links in the causal chains 
that explain the behavior of projects. 
Thus, the second implication:
(2) The human reactions to events need to 
be accounted for in analyzing risk.
The fifth dimension of socio-political 
risk acknowledges the increasingly rec-
ognized political effects within projects. 
This is especially so for “softer” types 
of projects, such as IT-enabled change 
(e.g., see the analysis of the UK Govern-
ment so-called “Phoenix programme” 
[O’Leary & Williams, 2013]). For mega-
projects in particular, the (permanent) 
political environment within which 
the (temporary) projects sit becomes 
increasingly important to give the proj-
ect, and thus the work within the proj-
ect, meaning. In general, the actions 
of the two parties (client and contrac-
tor) within that environment can have 
a significant effect on projects. In the 
transaction-cost structure expounded by 
Brown et al. (2016), a key to success of a 
contract is whether each party acts in a 
“perfunctory” or “consummate” manner 
(the former conforms to the “letter” of 
the contract but has small gains for the 
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party but greater losses for the other side; 
the latter conforms to the spirit of “win-
win” and has small losses for the party 
but greater gains for the other side). 
How the parties react to project events 
and risk outturns has a strong effect on 
the project out-turn. Under conditions 
of complexity, this is particularly prob-
lematic, as often the ramifications of 
those reactions is not clear to the party 
undertaking them, so the party might 
not realize the damaging effects that it is 
setting up. Thus, the third implication is:
(3) The contracting parties’ reactions 
to events need to be accounted for in 
analyzing risk.
However, even these do not fully 
account for the complexity of risk out-
turns in a project. As described above, 
where risks set up causal chains—which 
might include human motivational 
reactions to events and/or decision 
making by the project parties—these 
can be significantly exacerbated when 
these chains lead to positive feedback 
loops. Indeed, some systems model-
ers will say that the feedback system 
provides a good explanation of how 
the system will behave. That is, where 
the project is in homeostasis (Thurston, 
2016) the project is under control, but 
once unwanted positive feedback loops 
(or “vicious circles”) are set up, the proj-
ect becomes out of control. In this way, 
seemingly quite small risks, if they come 
about, can have effects that are exac-
erbated with ramifications far greater 
than the original risk. When identified, 
the first goal should be to consider how 
to “break” such loops—in other words, 
management actions that can remove 
one or more of the causal loops that 
form the loop (such as considering a 
system freeze as shown in Figure 1). 
Thus, the fourth implication is:
(4) Detrimental positive feedback needs to 
be identified in analyzing risk.
The implication therefore is that risk 
needs to be treated differently within 
complex projects. The discussion above 
therefore facilitates a structured under-
standing of why:
• Structural complexity implies multiple 
interacting elements; where there are 
uncertainty and dynamics in the sys-
tem, risks will then have causal chains 
of ramifications, and risks will interact 
in multiple inter-connecting ways.
• When the system is further disrupted 
by pace, acceleration becomes both 
necessary and problematic because 
actions will interact with the causal 
chains of these ramifications.
• These interactions include socio-
complexity in the causal chains of 
ramifications from human reactions 
to events.
• These causal chains can interact with 
ramifications from the socio-political 
complexity of the project environment, 
in particular reactions to events from 
the contracting parties.
• All of these ramified causal chains 
make the understanding of risk diffi-
cult and requires analysis; however, an 
extra dimension of complexity comes 
where these causal chains combine 
into detrimental positive feedback. In 
this way, risks collectively become a 
serious significant overall risk.
Key Risks in a Project
A main conclusion of this article is that 
the risks identified by current methods 
as the most important risks might not 
actually be the key risks in a project. 
When risks are identified and analyzed 
in a conventional risk analysis, it is those 
risks with the greatest direct impact, 
when considered on their own, that are 
always placed as the most important, 
and which thus gain the most atten-
tion of management. In a complex 
project, however, the ramifications of 
risks might be greater than the direct 
impacts. Examples are reviewed next, in 
the order as discussed above.
1. The Combination of Risks and 
Human Reactions
A project in which the author was 
involved in was an arbitration that 
involved the manufacture of a ship, 
of a type which was technologically 
advanced and whose design was far 
from finalized. Thus, the two risks were: 
the state-of-the-art technology being 
used and the immaturity of the design. 
There were two additional sources of 
risk within the project: first, the accep-
tance criteria were not well-defined; and 
second, (a probably unidentified risk) 
the client’s inspection team were (the 
contractor felt) unreasonably demand-
ing. Each of these four risks, except for 
possibly the first, would probably not 
have appeared as major risks on a risk 
register. The combination of all of them, 
however, meant that the inspection 
and acceptance process proved very 
problematic, as demanding inspectors 
could claim that novel items, with some 
aspects not agreed on pre-contract 
due to the immature design, did not 
meet their stringent interpretation of 
the ill-defined criteria. Furthermore, as 
well as the risks themselves interact-
ing, the causal chains emanating from 
these combinations included design-
ers disagreeing with inspectors, being 
over-ruled, having to re-work, becom-
ing disheartened and thus lowering pro-
ductivity and increasing error rates, and 
so on (see Figure 2). Each risk individu-
ally might have been manageable; when 
they are combined with the resulting 
human reactions then they are not man-
ageable. Following the logic discussed 
earlier meant that some of these items 
looped back to create vicious circles.
Sometimes significant risks are sim-
ply increases in the degree of risks that 
are accepted as normal project issues: 
The approval delays depicted in Figure 1 
were simply an increase of delays over 
and above the contracted limit, the 
cumulative effect of which would be dif-
ficult to assess. The extreme example of 
15,000 design changes is quoted below.
2. Pace and Management Actions
The “Shuttle Wagons” work referred 
to earlier (Ackermann et al., 1997) 
de scribes the need to make manage-
ment deci sions in a high-pace project 
105546_PMJ_04_055-066_Williams.indd   60 7/11/17   1:13 AM
August/September 2017  ■  Project Management Journal  61
(see Figure 1). In this case, this included 
parallel working and pre-emptive 
designs, which exacerbated the posi-
tive feedback loops of work-arounds, 
rework, and subsequent disruptions 
and delays. In this way, initiating risks, 
which are manageable in themselves 
(such as the effects of the London fire 
referred to earlier), create causal loops 
that have effects much greater than 
expected.
3. Individuals within the Parties
The construction of the Scottish Parlia-
ment infamously resulted in a cost ten 
times higher than the original (under-
estimated) budget. At the public enquiry 
in 2004, the project manager was reported 
as stating that there had been 15,000 
design changes to the building (British 
Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2004). 
Each individual change would have had 
little effect on the project; on the other 
hand, the effect of a deluge of tempo-
rally overlapping design changes caused 
considerable problems. These were both 
engineering problems and designers’ 
reactions to multiple changes, with their 
work sometimes becoming futile. It is 
interesting to reflect on whether “lack 
of governance within the client” (which 
was perhaps what allowed the users to 
specify changes continuously) would or 
should have been a risk identified at 
the start of the project, let alone its true 
impact. (Further, even if a client had 
been aware of the changes, would he or 
she have been aware of the effects of the 
changes on the project?)
4. Inter-Personal Relationships 
between the Project Parties
Some of the risks themselves can be 
interpersonal rather than technical; thus 
the character of the project manager, for 
example, can cause problems in agreeing 
on designs, changes, and client accep-
tance. The need for trust between cli-
ent and contractor ( Kadefors, 2004) and 
within an alliance (Krishnan, Martin, & 
Noorderhaven, 2006) and the effect of 
lack of trust on the performance of the 
project are well-known. A difficult char-
acter, or troubled interpersonal relation-
ships, can produce delays and the need 
for additional work, which dishearten 
the team, disrupt the project, and set 
up vicious circles of delay and disrup-
tion. Indeed, some would say that trust 
between the contractor and owner is 
one of the most important contribu-
tors to project success, yet trust rarely 
appears on a risk register. Eden, Acker-
mann, and Williams (2005) present an 
example of a paper mill project, in which 
there were “endless” talking and meet-
ings, slowing the rate of production and 
a customer who insisted on  unnecessary 
benchmarking and changing documents 
late in the process, and so on.
5. Contracts between the 
Project Parties
Risks can result from different inter-
pretations of contracts between the 
customer and contractor. Eden et al. 
(2005) present an example of a rolling-
stock project, in which the passenger 
doors were not sufficiently watertight 
to satisfy the customer, because under 
extreme test conditions there was a 
small amount of water ingress. The con-
tractor argued that no train had ever met 
these criteria, and it was clear that the 
contract was ambiguous on the perfor-
mance specification. This led to many 
tests, studies by independent experts in 
the field, and a final solution, but this 
caused many designs to be revisited and 
changed, which created ripple effects 
and schedule delays. Again, there was a 
small initiating risk, but there were also 
major ramifications.
6. Culture within the Project Parties
In cases in which the industrial sec-
tor has moved from the public sector 
to the private sector, it can be said that 
contractual relationships have changed 
to reflect the new environment, yet cul-
ture and working practices have not. 
Where a public-sector client is used to 
1 State-of-the-art
technology
2 Immaturity of the
design
3 Acceptance criteria
not well-defined
4 Client's inspection
team unreasonably
demanding
5 Multiple
inspection failures
6 Disagreements
7 Re-work
8 Disheartened
engineers 9 Lower productivity
10 More errors
Figure 2: Combinations of risks and the resulting human reactions.
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being part of the same organization exe-
cuting a project, the associated behav-
ior may not match the demands of a 
well-defined contractual relationship. A 
culture that is used to continuous design 
review or ongoing changes mid-project 
is at odds with a fixed-price contract. 
This can lead to redesign and rework as 
a project tries to meet increasingly unre-
alistic fixed time- and cost-targets, while 
requirements keep changing, leading to 
a cycle of increased work, more delay, 
frustration, loss of control and/or mean-
ing felt by designers and engineers, and 
increased workarounds.
7. Changes to the Project Parties
Changes in the client’s strategy can be 
a significant risk. In December 1994, 
following direction from the U.S. gov-
ernment, Amtrak was given the goal of 
eliminating its need for federal oper-
ating subsidies. Working through the 
implications of this meant that Amtrak 
had to rethink their strategy; at the same 
time, it was engaged in a project to 
design and produce the new Northeast 
Corridor Acela trains. It has been sug-
gested, therefore, that it is no coinci-
dence that there were major changes 
to this project and thus rework; thus 
causing all the natural human reactions 
to major changes to work already done 
in a project and subsequent significant 
disruption to the project. Again, the 
client’s change in strategic direction 
is unlikely to have been on the origi-
nal project risk register, but can cause 
major  ramifications.
It is likely that none of these risks 
would appear on a risk register, let alone 
a list of “top ten” risks; however, by set-
ting up vicious circles of disruption, they 
can cause much more damage to project 
performance than simple one-off risks. 
The risks likely to produce vicious cir-
cles are those likely to produce the most 
risk to the project. An individual risk 
whose effect can be contained will only 
have that effect on the project. Where 
a risk sets up causal chains of effects 
through human reactions to the events, 
and whose ramifications are multiplied 
by unwanted positive feedback, with 
management actions exacerbating 
these feedback loops, its effects will be 
much greater. Humans have significant 
difficulty in estimating the probabilities 
and impacts of epistemic risks (see, for 
example the, discussion in Winch & 
Maytorena, 2011, pp. 350–351). It could 
therefore be argued that the degree of 
positive feedback from a risk is a more 
reliable indicator of importance to the 
project, although the organization must 
be set up to comprehend the full impli-
cations of a risk rather than a siloed 
view of direct consequences.
One Aid: Mapping Risk
As an aid to looking at risks with the fea-
tures just described, a natural method 
is to structure the risks in a “risk map.” 
This term is used here to denote a causal 
map capturing systemicity (rather than 
simplistic probability-impact grids, for 
example, Jordan, Jorgenese, and Mit-
terhofer, 2013). Mapping project effects 
is a recognized part of systemic model-
ing work, and indeed has recently been 
extended into other uses in understand-
ing projects (Ackermann & Alexander, 
2016). Initial mapping is often loose, 
dealing with rough concepts; to trace 
causality, however, this needs to be 
honed into a map of clearly defined vari-
ables. This should be at least a “Stage 2 
Cause Map” and working toward the 
“Stage 3 Influence Diagram” of Howick 
et al. (2008); being able to put “1” for a 
positive influence (or “2” for a negative 
influence) is an essential part of iden-
tifying positive feedback (see Sterman, 
2000). Some positive feedback may be 
beneficial (“virtuous circles”), but it is 
the detrimental positive feedback that 
needs to be identified.
Risk mapping carried out by an 
individual can start from the risks that 
would form a risk register and the proj-
ect objectives that will be affected by 
“risk.” Then, by considering causal 
chains between items on the map, and 
“so what if this happens” and “what 
would make this happen” (i.e., the 
causal chains both up to and following 
an item), a causal map of the possible 
occurrences within a project can be 
built. The key is to include within the 
map the mitigation actions that would 
be taken (whether or not by conscious 
decision) by the project team and the 
expected behavior of the project partici-
pants since, as discussed above, these 
can often be critical elements in the 
causality.
The process of developing the risk 
map is as useful as the output and 
requires clarity, because thought is given 
to the chaining, yet it also enhances 
creativity as different future pathways 
are suggested. Positive feedback loops 
can be identified, as well as synergistic 
actions that will ameliorate a set of risks. 
Figure 3 illustrates a small example of a 
map with three risks (with no border), 
causing chains of consequences—four 
of which (with no border but italic) are 
human responses to the risks—resulting 
in two outcomes (in oval borders). (This 
simple map has multiple loops, although 
removing the element “Engineers dis-
heartened” removes one third of them.)
“Individuals only ever have a par-
tial view of risk” (Hardy & McGuire, 
2016). The method becomes particu-
larly useful in a group, as it aids com-
munication and brings out interactions 
as well as cultural differences between 
groups, thus providing a richer set of 
knowledge. This requires the group to 
be suitably heterogeneous, and within 
the group there needs to be an over-
view of the whole project and an under-
standing of the management and team’s 
likely reactions to events. Discussion can 
lead to paradigmatic differences or even 
incompatibilities as heterogeneous risks 
(including, for example, both engineer-
ing and psychological concepts) are 
combined—but this in itself aids intra-
group communication and establish-
ment of the overall risk picture.
The information on the map is valu-
able in various ways (Ackermann et al., 
2014), including the following:
(1) The information contains knowl-
edge of the systemicity.
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(2) Use of mapping software can cat-
egorize the risks in various ways 
(e.g., as shown in Figure 3) and show 
the “big picture” or detail.
(3) The map provides understanding, 
traceability of the information, and 
the identification of synergistic risk 
mitigation actions.
(4) The map can be used to identify 
prospective feedback loops and 
prompt questions on how to ‘break’ 
such loops.
(5) The map can help in scenario analy-
sis as the likely effects of outcomes 
are explored.
(6) The map can underpin project cate-
gorization (Ackermann et al., 2007).
The map can also provide a founda-
tion for quantification. This can be a 
major task, which has been used more 
in post-hoc arbitration than in a priori 
risk analysis. It can provide a traceable 
structured basis for system dynamics 
analysis (Howick et al., 2008), which 
can help us understand how causali-
ties are likely to interact or predict the 
likely behavior of an upcoming proj-
ect (Rodrigues & Williams, 1998). It 
can also provide a useful basis for risk 
assessment, particularly since assess-
ing subjective probabilities is fraught 
with difficulty if the causes are not split 
out explicitly or if the item whose prob-
ability is being assessed is part of a posi-
tive feedback loop (so its very presence 
makes itself more likely). For exam-
ple, consider that we need to assess 
a probability that a client will delay 
design approvals too much; in this case, 
however, there is positive feedback (as 
shown in Figure 4) and the probability 
needs very careful definition to esti-
mate. In this type of situation, the input 
causes need to be split out (probabili-
ties associated with the different arrows 
in Figure 4 assessed separately) or the 
probability needs to be identified as at 
time zero, or some other clear defini-
tion of the probabilities to be estimated. 
In practice, if a significant detrimen-
tal positive-feedback loop is identified, 
then the first discussion will be about 
how to ‘break’ that feedback loop; once 
that has been done, the remaining risk 
can be quantified.
Conclusions
Front-end analysis and preparation are 
becoming increasingly important in 
the management of complex projects 
(Williams & Samset, 2012). A vital part 
of this is understanding the risks that 
the project faces. Standard methodolo-
gies evaluate these risks individually 
and without considering the human 
ramifications of each risk. Our under-
standing of complex projects shows us 
that risks affect projects in combinations 
Loose
specification
Design changes
Delay in approvals
Changes caused
to other systems
Manufacturing before
approval
Manufacturing
rework
Design delays
Tight time
constraint
Additional
manufacturing work
Design re-work
extra labor
Training requirements
(manufacturing workers)
Delays to other
systems
Timescale brought
forward
extra skilled
engineers
Training
requirements
(engineers)
Lower productivity
(engineers)
Lower productivity
(manufacturing)
Delay in product
delivery
Increased cost
Engineers
disheartened
Design errors
Figure 3: An example risk map (using Decision Explorer® Banxia Software, UK).
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and structures of risks. While this has 
been recognized to some extent in the 
literature, the key here is that the impor-
tant causal linkages are the reactions to 
risks; in particular, there are reactions 
by the project manager in the context 
of needing to make fast decisions in the 
heat of the project, and reactions by the 
project team in terms of motivation and 
fatigue. Often the risks that cause project 
runaway are not individual, separate 
risks, but rather combinations of risks 
in causal chains that, along with man-
agement actions and team reactions 
considered, build up “vicious circles” 
of disruption. If one looks at a typical 
risk register in practice, the types of 
risks discussed in this article often don’t 
appear at all, although they might be the 
critical risks that will bring a project to, 
or near, failure. We have used Geraldi 
et al. (2011) to structure where such risks 
might arise. We provide mechanisms for 
understanding such risks, which could 
inform the client and contractor alike 
and who, otherwise would not be able 
to fully understand the ramifications 
of their actions, and therefore not have 
a basis for acting “commensurately” 
(Brown et al., 2016), even if so inclined. 
The logic in this article highlights the 
effort to identifying positive feedback 
loops in risk structures and considering 
how to “break” these as a significant step 
in risk analysis. And, finally, we have 
encouraged a view of risk as a system 
rather than individual risks to under-
stand properly  the risk to projects.
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